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The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to
its Increasingly Advantageous Quality,

and an Encouragement to Continue
the Trend
JOHN W. WADE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Keyes has drawn up a strong and challenging indictment
against the American Law Institute and its product, the second Restatement of the Law. The charges are hypercritical and severe.
The central theme of these charges amounts essentially to this: the
second Restatement is not an update of the first Restatement. Instead, the Institute has abandoned its first Restatement goal of stating, with clarity, precision, and certainty, the common law of the
United States as it is, so that those who seek to learn the law on a
topic covered by one of the Restatements can find it set forth in an
authoritative and accurate form, entitled to implicit reliance. On the
contrary, the drafters are now engaged in stating their own subjective views on what the law ought to be, rather than what it is. Worse
yet, they have not disclosed that they are doing this, and are therefore misleading the persons who unknowingly rely on the provisions
of the Restatement. This practice cannot be condoned, and the Institute must revert to the purpose and method that it followed in producing the first Restatement. If it declines, pressure must be brought
to bear upon it by other elements of the legal profession to require it
to return to its original plan.
My intention is to examine this indictment and its several charges
as objectively as I can and to set forth my conclusions. Fairness requires me to indicate that my connections with the Institute may
* Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, and Dean Emeritus, Vanderbilt University School of Law; Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law, 1984-85.

have created a bias that I cannot fully discard despite my best efforts
at objectivity.'
II.
A.

CHANGES BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND RESTATEMENTS

Method of Preparation

The method of preparing the Restatement, starting with the first
one, 2 has been for the Institute to appoint a Reporter who, in collaboration with the Institute's Director, selects an advisory committee
composed of judges, attorneys, and professors. The Reporter for each
subject prepares a Preliminary Draft of a selected portion of the project, including notes for the Advisors referring to relevant cases.
These drafts are studied carefully by the Advisors, and the whole
Committee meets for a period of several days to discuss the material
submitted. Discussion is vigorous and quite uninhibited, often resulting in substantial alterations or a remand to the Reporter to rewrite
in the light of the discussion. Reworked and rewritten, it is then prepared as a Council Draft, submitted to the A.L.I. Council (a group of
around fifty leaders of the legal profession) for its criticisms and suggestions. Once again there is vigorous discussion. The Reporter then
reworks it again and prepares a Tentative Draft (including Reporter's
Notes with citations) for submission to each member of the Institute
for comments. These Tentative Drafts are available to the public and
may be found in law libraries.
A substantial percentage of the members are present at the annual
meeting of the Institute and participate in the active debates on the
individual sections. Votes of the members are often taken. In the
light of decisions reached, the Reporter reworks the draft again. If a
complete reworking is involved, the draft may go through the whole
process again, but this is not ordinarily required.
This is the process followed with little change for both the first and
second Restatements. It is quite time-consuming, and means that a
Restatement on a particular subject is years in the making. The purl. I have been involved with the Institute in the following capacities: member of
the American Law Institute since 1952; member of the Advisory Committee for the
second Restatement of Torts, 1965-1970; Reporter for the second Restatement of Torts,
Volumes 3 and 4, 1970-1982; member of the American Law Institute Council, 1959-1970
and since 1982; member of the Advisory Committee for the second Restatement of Restitution since 1982.
Mr. Keyes had completed a first draft of his article when I came to Pepperdine Law
School as a visiting professor for the 1984-85 academic year. He gave me a copy to read
and he and I engaged in extended and vigorous discussion, coming to the mutual conclusion that neither of us could persuade the other. Then we amicably agreed that it
might be useful to present both points of view in a pair of articles published together.
2. See Lewis, "How We Did It", in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1, 5-6 (1945); H.
GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1923-1961
(1961); Darrell & Wolkin, American Law Institute, 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 99 (1980).
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pose of this process is to insure that all of the significant elements of
the legal profession, in all parts of the country, are given a full opportunity to participate in presenting their points of view and determining what the Restatements have to say.
Although the process has been refined over the years, there has
been no substantial change in it since the beginning.
B.

Format

The format adopted in the first Restatement was to divide each
chapter into sections headed by a Blackletter statement of a precise,
unequivocal rule of law. To this there were usually added a few crisp
paragraphs of Comments, containing a sentence or so explaining or
interpreting the Blackletter. Sometimes short factual illustrations
were given to make the meaning clear. But there was no general discussion or exposition of the rationale behind the rule or citation, or
discussion of case authority. The authority of the Institute was regarded as a sufficient authentication of the Blackletter. The initial
plan was for the Reporter to supply the discussion and citations by
preparing a treatise covering the subject as a supplement to the Restatement. But this part of the program fell through because of the
Institute's inability to produce a group version of the treatise, as had
been done for the Restatement itself.
The Restatement sections themselves were regarded as providing
their own authority. Later volumes of the first Restatement gradually came to have more extensive discussion, but the essential format
was not changed.
Case citations were later included by preparing small volumes of
annotations for individual states for the various Restatements, but
this part of the program did not appear to develop much enthusiasm,
and has gradually fallen into disuse.
The basic system of Blackletter, Comments, and Illustrations has
been retained in the second Restatement. The Comments are much
more discursive, treating the rationale and application of the rule in
considerable detail. Often the Blackletter is written in more general,
more flexible language, and it now serves primarily as an introduction to the Comments, which provide the essence of the treatment.
Illustrations have not been greatly changed. But citation of authorities is now an integral part of the format. A Reporter's Note is attached to the published section - sometimes in the same volume at
the end of each section, sometimes in separate appendix volumes.

This Note explains the relationship of each section to the similar section in the first Restatement, indicates the extent to which the rule of
each section is generally followed, and gives citations to pertinent
cases. Case citations accompanying some subjects in the Restatement
are quite copious; in other subjects they are limited to a few carefully
chosen cases.
C. Substantive Content
The stated goal of the first Restatement was to set forth the general law (or the common law) of the United States with clarity and
certainty. 3 The Institute did not undertake to spell out clearly what
test was to be used for ascertaining what the general common law actually was. As a result, many users of the Restatement seemed to
have assumed that the test would normally be the position taken by a
majority of the states passing on the issue. It is hard to believe that
the Reporters and their Advisors, even in the first Restatement, made
a point of compiling the number of states lined up on each side of an
issue and mechanically adopted the side with the most votes. Many
court decisions are very difficult to interpret and thus very difficult
to "line up." Some opinions are much more cogently reasoned and
persuasive than others. Some courts and judges are generally regarded as distinctly more able than others. Some rules are more logically consistent with the principles underlying the particular area of
the law; some rules balance the conflicting interests of the parties
more fairly.
The leaders in the Institute sometimes spoke of the general principles underlying the decisions. This provided substantial leeway. In a
few instances in the first Restatement, the drafters adopted a rule
that persons already acquainted with the law would immediately rec4
ognize as following a distinctly minority position.
Those primarily responsible for the second Restatement did not attempt to develop a firmly established test for determining the present state of the general common law. They instead came to utilize a
growing amount of leeway in making this determination and in
choosing the language for stating the rule or principle. Minority positions were somewhat more frequently adopted, and broader or more
generalized language was often used in the Blackletter.
It is this difference (of degree and not of kind) that Professor
Keyes deprecates and condemns as expressing the subjective view3. "The function of the Institute is to state clearly and precisely in the light of
the decisions the principles and rules of the common law." Introduction to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at ix (1932).
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 90 (1932) (action in reliance on promise as making it enforceable); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 60 (1934) (mutual affray and
consent to battery).
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point of the drafters rather than the true state of the law as it existed
at the time of the preparation of the particular Restatement.
III.
A.

THE "COMMON LAW OF THE UNITED STATES"

The Appellate Courts and the Common Law

First Stage. There was a notion widely believed at one time that
the common law was an integral system existing independently of
the actions of the courts. The function of the courts was not to create
the law but to discover it and declare it in their decisions. For them
to create or change the law or declare it contrary to its true form was
regarded as a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and a usurpation of power.5 According to this view, the task
of the Restater, like that of the appellate courts, was to "divine" the
true law and set it forth with clarity.
Second Stage. This "true law" came to be regarded as not entirely
and irrevocably changeless. A series of decisions stating various exceptions to a legal rule falling out of accord with modern conditions
might be judicially analyzed as having eroded the rule so far that the
correct rule was now appropriately stated the other way, with possi6
ble exceptions applying the old rule only to special circumstances.
This technique, used charily in the beginning, has come to be utilized
more frequently and more extensively over the years.
Third Stage. In more recent years a growing number of appellate
courts have substantially changed the nature of their approach. They
are no longer discovering the "true law" but are instead in the process of managing the developing evolution of the common law in order to point it in the right direction. These courts no longer hesitate
to change a rule of law when they decide that it is unjust and out of
accord with current ideals and mores and does not properly meet
present social and economic needs. Openly and frankly declaring
that they are changing the law, they are ready to regard this action as
part of the judicial function. As appellate judges were the original
creators of the common law, they are now assuming the function of
keeping it up-to-date. More and more, courts are dropping the cir5. See, e.g., Carter, Provinces of the Written and Unwritten Law, 2 VA. ST. B.A.
(1889). See generally R. POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND
REASON (1960).
6. The classic example is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916), where Judge Cardozo relaxed the requirement of privity of contract in a
negligence action by an injured party against the product's manufacturer.
REP. 95

cumlocutions of an earlier day and accepting responsibility for the
present state of the common law. This concept, or technique, is now
becoming part of the common law system itself.
As they proceed to assume this responsibility, judges must recognize that it is a very heavy and significant one, not to be exercised
lightly. No longer can they rely on such subterfuges as the one that
courts are not really making the law but merely discovering it; the
one that the law has itself changed and they are merely declaring it;
or the one that there exists an "implied" provision, covenant, or warranty in the transaction of the parties.
This process has been more extensively developed in certain areas
of the law than in others. The field of torts is one in which the judicial changes have been most frequent and extensive. In tort cases the
rules of law are relied on not so much for determining what kind of
conduct can be engaged in without subjecting oneself to liability, but
for the purpose of attaining a just result after one party has been injured. 7 In property and commercial law, on the other hand, the
prime function of the rules of law is to enable parties to attain the
binding result that they desire. To make a judicial change in the law
that produces a different result after the transaction has taken place
is not defensible.8 Yet the courts have found a way to meet this problem. The technique of "sunbursting" - directing that the judicial
change will take effect only prospectively, under such conditions as
the court may lay down 9 - means that transactions entered into
prior to the judicial decision are not affected by the decision and thus
eliminates the unfairness that would otherwise result.1o
IV.

THE RESTATEMENTS AND THE COMMON LAW

The task of the persons preparing the Restatement may differ in
several respects from that of an appellate court making a decision for
a particular state. Yet you will surely agree that my overly brief
tracing of the development of judicial participation in the evolution
7. The technique of frankly admitting that the court was changing a rule of law
began around 1960 in the law of torts. See Wade, The Most Important Tort Change in
the Third Quarterof the Twentieth Century, 20 AM. TRIAL LAW. A.L. REP. 413 (1977);
Wade, Recent Developments in Tort Law and the Federal Courts, 72 Ky. L.J. 1 (1983).
An earlier recognition of this is found in R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 169 (1969). See generally Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1983).
8. For a discussion on the difference between tort law and commercial or property law, see Seavey, The Restatement, Second, and Stare Decisis, 48 A.B.A. J. 317, 318
(1962).
9. The name "sunbursting" comes from Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts":Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 634 (1967).
10. For application to the law of property, see Casner, Restatement (Second) of

Property as an Instrument of Law Reform, 67 IOWA L. REV. 87, 91-96 (1981).
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of the common law is quite relevant to an understanding of the task
of the Restaters. Suppose there are several different positions taken
on a particular issue in the various states. Should the Restaters rely
on a simple compilation of the number of states supporting each position and then automatically pick the majority position? If the position in a particular state is unclear, do they use their own
interpretation of it? Should they give greater weight to the opinions
of those courts generally recognized as possessing superior talent, or
to particular opinions that are unusually well-reasoned and therefore
more persuasive?
Should they instead look to the broad principles underlying the
rules governing particular issues and determine what rule is most
consistent with the general principle? Does this mean, if the rule
seems to fit in well with the general principles but the legal analysis
generally given in support of the rule seems logically unsound, that
they should make use of the more logical analysis while retaining the
rule? Should they give any consideration to their own viewpoint regarding logical consistency and the desirability of the ultimate results
of particular rules?11
The answer to these questions is that the Restaters normally look
first to see if there is a clear majority rule. In many situations, however, the elements raised in each of the above questions may perforce
play a significant part in reaching conclusions as to what the Restatement should say; the result may be an amalgam of these various considerations. Does this mean that the individual sections are a result
of subjective determinations? Yes, it does. But I again call attention
to the nature of the drafting procedures and the stages involved in
reaching the final draft: preliminary draft by the Reporter after intensive study; debates with the Advisory Committee; presentation
before the Council; and presentation to the Institute floor. There is
vigorous and uninhibited debate at all levels, with changes often being made and the whole topic not infrequently being referred back to
the Reporter for complete reworking in the light of the discussion.
Many points of view and varying types of experience with the prob11. In 1948, then Director Herbert Goodrich remarked in his annual report that in
"cases of division of opinion a choice had to be made and naturally we chose the one
we thought was right." Goodrich, Report of the Director,25 A.L.I. PRoc. 18, 18 (1948).
See also Goodrich, Restatement and Codification, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 242 (1949). Cf. Fleming, The Restatement and Codification, 2 JEWISH L. ANN.
108, 116 (1979) ("Hence numerous conflicts had to be resolved in favor of 'the better
rule,' i.e., the more principled solution; besides the manner of formulation often betrays, if discreetly, the individual biases of the Reporter or his Advisors.")

lem are involved in the procedure. A composite determination based
on this process certainly acquires an objective character.
The goal of the first Restatement was "to state clearly and precisely
in the light of the decisions the principles and rules of the common
law."12 The common law at any particular point of time was regarded as ascertainable from the decisions and opinions that had
been rendered as of that time. Some of these decisions may have
been rendered many years ago, with no more recent decisions arising
in the jurisdiction. With a static law, unchangeable except for legislative action, the age of a decision would make no difference in its authority. With the modified attitude concerning the responsibility of
the appellate courts in regard to the state of the common law, however, the issue to be decided in determining the common law rule in
a particular state is not necessarily what was the rule applied in its
last judicial holding, but what the Institute believes the state's high13
est court would now decide if the case were before it at this time.
This is not just a creation of the imagination of an impractical academic. It occurs frequently in actual practice in the application of
the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.14 A federal district court
must apply state law in a diversity case, and often finds itself confronted with the problem of deciding how the state court would now
decide the issue. When there is a developing trend in the law - for
example, judicial abolition or modification of interspousal tort immunity - a Reporter who is well-acquainted with the law of his subject,
particularly recent decisions, can more accurately predict that a
number of undesignated state courts will lay down changes in the
law when the issue next comes before them than a federal district
court can predict what the state court in a particular state would do.
Under the newly-assumed responsibility for the status of the common law, as many courts now regard it, trends necessarily become
quite important for the Restaters.
I conclude this necessarily brief treatment of the appellate courts
and the common law by quoting some remarks of Professor Herbert
Wechsler. In his capacity as Director of the Institute, he has had occasion to discuss this matter with some frequency. These remarks
were part of a speech at the annual Institute banquet held in May,
1984, upon his retirement from the position of Director.
Half a century ago, the bench, the bar and a good portion of the legal
professoriat were sharply divided in their conception of case law, a division be12. Introduction to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at ix (1932).
13. Cf Lewis, supra note 2, at 19: "The Restatement of each subject expresses as
nearly as may be the rules which our courts will today apply."
14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Cf Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,5 VAND.
L. REv. 407, 416 (1938) (lower federal courts trying to predict what the U.S. Supreme
Court will do).
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tween the adherents of an older school of thought and those who called for a
revision of the gospel.
The traditionalists held to the conception of the common law as a closed
system, yielding answers to all questions that arose in litigation by conformity
to earlier decisions or deduction from the principles that they declared. It is
difficult to realize today the strength of the allegiance to that view, not only
on the bench and at the bar but generally in the culture. Partisans of this
point of view obviously were confounded by the conflicts and the variations in
approach and in decisions that were so pronounced a feature of the product of
the courts. They welcomed an organ that would clarify and simplify by articulating the "right" principles and deducing their "correct" application, an organ
for pronouncing what was orthodox in areas of common law.
The opposing school... granted, of course, that precedent must play an important rule in any structure of case law. Their assertion was that the techniques of distinction and the multiplicity of inconsistent precedents and
doctrine left great room in the process of decision for considered choice by
courts, room that courts as they grew older had increasingly perceived. Moreover, they insisted, it is itself a tenet of the common law that courts have a
responsibility to reconsider and rework decisions of the past to serve new values and to meet emerging needs. Within the area where courts are left free to
choose, choice must be justified, it was submitted, upon grounds largely extrinsic to the system, calling for attention to the ends that law should serve in
our polity and the effects of a particular decision in promoting or retarding
policies that should prevail ....
The crucial point has always seemed to me to be that a decision when it
breaks new ground - or, indeed, when it refuses so to do - initiates a dialogue by its supporting reasons, reasons whose persuasiveness to others will
largely be the measure of its ultimate success ....
Needless to say, many supporters of the [second position] also welcomed in
the Institute a new organ that would undertake to work with the decisions not to promote the orthodoxy the traditionalists were so eager to propound
but rather to endorse and validate important new departures in the process of
rethinking
and revision taking hold at that time in some of our highest
15
courts.

V.

THE RESTATEMENTS AND LAW REFORM

Persons who are engaged in stating - or restating - the law for
the courts and other persons to rely on, will find themselves in a difficult position when they are convinced that the legal rule involved is
a "bad" rule, unjust in its effects and illogical in its relationship with
other rules. Laying down the bad rule may have the effect of reinforcing it and prolonging its lifespan. Stating a better rule may lead
one who relies upon it into unfortunate consequences when the court
does not follow it. Are the Restaters impaled on the horns of a
dilemma?6
15. Address by Professor Herbert Wechsler, Director of the American Law Institute, 61 A.L.I. PRoc. 408, 410-11 (1984).
16. See Leach, The Restatements as They Were in the Beginning, Are Now, and
Perhaps Henceforth Shall Be, 23 A.B.A. J. 517 (1937). A bylaw

Anyone who thinks about the problem for a moment will come to
realize that this is not a true dilemma. A Restater can select either
horn without fully committing himself if he explains the situation
and indicates why the choice was made.1 7 A person who reads the explanation carefully is not misled.
As the first Restatement was getting underway, however, the Institute was not ready to adopt this option. It expected its Blackletter
sections to be accepted on the basis of the magisterial authority of the
Institute, rather than the persuasive nature of an explanation of the
rule. Only occasionally did it adopt a rule that was followed by only
a small minority of the courts. When it did so, it ordinarily gave an
indication that this was so. When the Restaters laid down a minority
rule that they thought to be much better, they did not always call attention to it.18
In later work on some parts of the first Restatement this position
appears to have been somewhat relaxed. As the second Restatement
got underway some two decades later, the Restaters assigned to the
work felt more free to adopt a minority rule if a clear trend existed
in that direction, and this was normally done with a candid explanation of the matter.1 9
It is normal practice to state the majority rule in the Blackletter.
Sometimes, however, a minority rule is stated in the same Blackletter as if it were the majority rule; it is this practice that Professor
Keyes focuses on and emphatically condemns. To prove that the purpose of the Institute, as conceived by its founders, was to bring certainty and order from the mixture of precedents in this country, he
that we can never adversely criticize a rule which we find we have to state
. . . presents a very unpleasant dilemma to a Reporter. He must either state a
good rule which he knows perfectly well is not the law; or he must state a bad
rule and by his very statement entrench it further.
Id. at 519.
17. Professor Leach opted for stating the rule and indicating that it is bad and
why. Id. at 520. He concluded his talk by saying: "To me the essential aspect of the
present situation is that we are well on the road to recovery from a pretty serious institutional Jehovah complex; and the important thing for us to do is to admit it, nay
proclaim it, to ourselves and the world." Id. at 521. It may be important to note that
he was speaking about the Restatement of Property, which was one of the last of the
first Restatements to be completed, and came at a time when ex cathedra pronouncements were being softened.
18. "The accuracy of the statements of law made rests on the authority of the Institute. They may be regarded both as the product of expert opinion and as the expression of the law by the legal profession." Introduction to RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTRACTs at xi-xii (1932).

19. Ex cathedra statements are no longer the rule. Significant authorities are
now cited where their citation is called for as an aid to the user. All this is
helpful in setting forth the reasons the Restatement adopts one view or another in instances of difficult questions and a division of authority.
H. GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, supra note 2, at 12-13; cf Leach, supra note 16, at 521. At
that time, work on the second Restatement had already started; Agency and Trusts had
been completed.
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quotes from a set of lectures by one of the leading founders of the
Institute, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo. Given in 1923, these lectures
were published a year later as a little book entitled The Growth of the
Law. The quoted selection reads:
The law of our day faces a twofold need. The first is the need of some restatement that will bring certainty and order out of the wilderness of precedent
....
The second is the need of a philosophy that will mediate between the
conflicting claims of stability and progress and supply a principle of growth.
The first need is deeply felt and widely acknowledged. The American Law
Institute, recently organized, is an attempt to meet it. 20

This quotation, and the idea that it expresses, are both fully accurate, but they are incomplete. The quotation begins the opening lecture in the series, and the initial paragraph continues:
The second [need], though less generally appreciated, is emerging year by year
to fuller recognition. My purpose in these lectures is to say something to you
about both, but most of all about the second.
'Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.' Here is the great antinomy confronting us at every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to
continue, must find some path of compromise. Two distinct tendencies, pulling in different directions, must be harnessed together and made to work
in
21
unison. All depends on the wisdom with which the joinder is effected.

The remainder of the lecture dwells on this subject; all of it is well
worth careful study and thought. I am impelled to quote a few
sentences from the last two paragraphs of that lecture:
The law's uncertainties are to be corrected, but so also are its deformities.
Often they go together, and the remedy that cures the one will be found to
cure the other. Restatement must include revision when the vestiges of organs, atrophied by disuse, will become centers of infection if left within the
social body.
...
Over-emphasis of certainty may carry us to the worship of an intolerable rigidity. If we were to state the law today as well as human minds can
state it, new problems, arising almost overnight, would encumber the ground
again....

Restatement will clear the ground of debris....

Existing rules

and principles can give us our present location, our bearings, our latitude and
longitude. The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The
law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle
22
of growth.

This elegant prose expresses the idea far more clearly and effectively than my pedestrian efforts can. I think you will agree that
while Judge Cardozo believed that the initial function of the first Restatement was to bring order out of the welter of decisions and to
portray the common law as an organized set of rules and principles,
20. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1 (1924), reprinted in M. HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 185 (1947).
21. B. CARDoZO, supra note 20, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 18-20.

he would have regarded the function of the second Restatement as
not only to update the first one by modifying the provisions that had
been fully changed by a majority of the courts, but also to work toward finding some path of compromise between the need for stability
and the principle of growth. Those who have labored on the preparation of the second Restatement have sought to use wisdom in determining that path of compromise.
Chronologically, it was at a time about halfway through the preparation of the second Restatement that many appellate courts began to
adopt the practice of frankly declaring that they were changing a
common law rule. As I suggested earlier, this practice now amounts
to assuming responsibility for the current condition of the common
law. As this trend continues to develop, it will certainly have a significant effect on future work in preparing the Restatements. Just as
the judges, in undertaking their new responsibility, must be careful
to exercise their power with wise restraint, so too must the Restaters
use caution in making recommendations to judges for appropriate
changes.
The Institute has not fully succeeded in establishing and communicating to the profession in general a clear policy regarding the relation of the Restatements to law reform and efforts to attain
uniformity in the law.23 In the years 1946 and 1947, however, during
the interim period between work on the first and second Restatements, a "Special Committee" was appointed "to report on recommendations for a future program for the American Law Institute."24
23. In his report to the Institute in 1967, Director Herbert Wechsler raised the
question whether "we should feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to all of
the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial function, deem it
right to weigh in theirs." Wechsler, Report of the Director, 44 A.L.I. PRoc. 483 (1967).
See also Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 185, 190 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change]. Without formal action, this
"working formula" was accepted by the Council in 1968. Id at 191.
Certainly, the Restaters should give consideration to the same circumstances that
the courts consider in reaching their decisions, but they may feel a little more limited
in adopting an entirely new rule than a court would be. There are a fair number of
instances in which a venturesome appellate court has reversed its rule of law and laid
down a rule that no other court has previously adopted. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (charitable immunity abolished); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (comparative negligence
substituted for contributory negligence); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (invention of "equitable indemnity" to allow apportionment of liability according to fault); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963) (parent-child immunity abolished). A Restatement Reporter would surely hesitate to try to do that. The major problem lies in finding a way merely to recommend a
change, rather than laying down a Blackletter rule to that effect. See infra notes 63-65
and accompanying text.
24. Report of the Special Committee on Future Program, Learned Hand, Chairman, submitted to Council of the American Law Institute (Mar. 18, 1947).
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Its report covered a number of separate topics, one of which was entitled "A Critique of Legal Rules." After giving hearty approval to the
accomplishments of the Restatements, the Committee continued its
comments:
There are plenty of illustrations in the various subjects of the Restatement
where the Institute stated the law as it found it even though had it felt free to
choose, a different rule would have been adopted....
We think that the time has come to study critically these rules which we
have so clearly stated. Such a study should indicate (1) what rules are
founded on historical accident, misconception of other cases and the like; (2)
what rules are unjustified by any principles of justice, but are unimportant or
harmless and may be left as they are because of the desirability of certainty;
(3) what rules are unsupportable in principle and evil in action; (4) what rules
are functionally or otherwise desirable, but have been established upon
grounds that are unsound or inapplicable and which may lead in later cases to
erroneous or unjust applications of the rule.
In the conduct of such studies we should not only examine material in law
books to find the development of rules in legal history, but we should look to
nonlegal sources to find that state of things on which these legal rules are
called to operate. Such studies would, in effect, be critical appraisal of the
common law ...
So here, we think, is an inviting field for legal scholarship of a type for
which the Institute is particularly competent. There are many forms it might
take. It could begin, for example, with a critical examination of the contents
of some one portion of the Restatement, chapter by chapter or section by section. Such studies may lead to a demonstration of desirability of legislation in
possible further cooperative work with the Commissioners [on Uniform State
Laws]. Or they may lead to such a pronounced adverse criticism in narrow
situations that courts would feel free to change previous rules without waiting
for legislative authority.
The type of study and technique which would be involved is one with which
both the Institute and legal scholarship outside of the Institute are already familiar. In other words we should know pretty well where to start and what to
do. We have responsibility in the matter since the Institute's authority behind
the Restatement may conceivably grow so great as to prevent or retard
changes in adaptation of the common law which would otherwise occur
through natural growth. We are in a position where we can effectively and
hopefully promote that growth, not retard it .... 25

I have quoted from the report at some length because it was apparently not printed in any publication, available in law libraries, or
otherwise subject to citation. The quoted selection applied to the
work of the Institute in general and was not confined to the Restatements. But it would obviously apply primarily to work on the Restatements. Although the report does not appear to have been
formally adopted, it must still have had some effect. It should have, I
strongly believe, much more effect, and should also be given careful
attention as plans come to be considered for the next round of Re25. Id

statements. Even before that time arrives, thought may appropriately be given to other ways of implementing the Institute's
26
responsibility for law reform.
In one respect - the method of preparation - the Restatement
program is very suitable for promoting law reform. The Reporter of
a particular Restatement and his Advisory Committee are selected
both for their scholarship and learning in the field and for their objectivity in treating controversial issues; the Council and the Institute
members serve as an excellent balancing factor, assuring due consideration for all points of view. The format of the Restatements themselves, however, is not now adequately suitable for this purpose.
There needs to be developed an established means for supplementing
traditional Blackletter and Comment with formal recommendations
for improving the restated law as it is expressed in a particular
Restatement.
I am not now referring to a case in which a choice has been made
between two recognized lines of authority and the minority position
is selected for the Blackletter rule. That practice was followed in a
good number of cases, even in the first Restatement, and it is fully in
accord with statements in the original Report of the Committee on
Establishment. 27 I am talking about expressing disapproval of the
Blackletter even though there is little or no authority the other way.
26. In 1968, A.L.I. Director Herbert Wechsler quoted the statement of the Special
Committee on Future Program given in the text above in an address to the Conference
of Chief Justices. He added as his concluding remarks:
Such an enterprise seemed to some members of the A.L.I. Council to be too
large a task to undertake; possibly it was and is. But if the Institute cannot
work back through the Restatements, with a view to finding where the law
that it has stated is in need of renovation, should it not make clear as it proceeds the areas in which it thinks renovation is in order either by adjudication
or by legislative change, indicating which is deemed appropriate?
I do not hesitate to state my own opinion that it should. Until it does, restatement work will make a smaller contribution than it can to the great task
that lies before us: the continual refreshment of the legal system we have had
the fortune to inherit and have the duty to maintain and improve.
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 151 (1969); see also Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change, supra note 23, at 194.
For my part, I do not hesitate to indicate my full endorsement of this thought.
27. Again, where the law is uncertain or where differences in the law of different jurisdictions exist not -due to differences in economic or social conditions, the restatement, while setting forth the existing uncertainty, should
make clear what is believed to be the proper rule of law. The degree of existing uncertainty in the law would not necessarily be reduced by a mere explanation of rival legal theories. Indeed, a restatement which confined itself
to such an explanation would reduce the degree of existing uncertainty only
in those instances where but one line of decision was supported by reasons
worthy of consideration. Where the uncertainty is due, as it often is, to the
existence of situations presenting legal problems on the proper solution of
which trained lawyers may differ, the court can best be helped by support
given to one definite answer to the problem.
Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute
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The Blackletter would reflect the actual state of the law, but the discussion would suggest the desirability of changing it for a better rule.
This would mean completely eradicating what was regarded in the
early days of Restatement history as a taboo against criticism of the
stated Blackletter rule.
The criticism might be placed in the Comments with a heading
such as "Criticism of the Rule." Of course, it could be in the Reporter's Note, but this would state it as only a personal criticism of
the Reporter, while the approbation of the Institute would give it added weight. A different method would be to compile a list of suggested improvements in the law for a completed chapter or volume of
the Restatement. This list could be published separately or in the Restatement itself. In any event, if legislation should be regarded as the
appropriate way to make the change, it would be desirable to draft
and offer a suggested act. More frequently, I think, the change
would be one that the courts, in their newly-found responsibility for
keeping the common law up-to-date, would regard themselves as capable of accomplishing. Perhaps an outline of the proposed reasoning
28
in the court's opinion could also be suggested.
The Restatements are also helpful in promoting uniformity of the
law. Appropriate attention given to this in the Comments can serve a
very useful purpose.
It is appropriate to refer here to a current project of the Institute
that is trying a new approach - Principlesof Corporate Governance
and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations. As this project is
presently developing, it adopts a format very similar to the Restate(Feb. 1923), reprinted in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 11, 22-23
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Report of the 1923 Committee].
The Report of the 1923 Committee likewise declares that "[tihe character of the restatement which we have in mind can best be described by saying that it should be at
once analytical, critical and constructive." Id. at 22. It also speaks of the "province of
the restatement to suggest" changes in the law, id at 23, subject to stated limitations
and asserts that the
restatement here described, if adequately done, will do more to improve the
law than any other thing the legal profession can undertake . . . [and] will
also effect changes in the law, which it is proper for an organization of lawyers to promote and which will make the law better adapted to the needs of
life.
Id. at 25.
Does all of this, in the original document proposing the Institute, seem inconsistent
with what Professor Keyes has criticized in the second Restatement?
28. Legislation might more appropriately be suggested when the change would be
more extensive and have complicating ramifications. Judicial action would be suggested when the change involves the simple overruling of an existing decision.

ments - Blackletter, Comments, and Reporter's Notes. But the
Blackletter is not always posed in terms of what the law is now; instead, it is posed in terms of what the law should be. Often the two
are in accord. If not, changes in the law are required, sometimes by
judicial action, sometimes by statute. As this project is developing, it
is being refined and improved. The final result, with a clear practice
of indicating what is now law and what is not, requiring legislative or
judicial action, may well turn out to be an excellent model for the
form of the third Restatement.
VI.

A.

SOME RECURRING DRAFTING PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES

Improving the Statement of the Rule and the Explanation of the
Basis For It.

Sometimes courts develop a legal rule through a rather lengthy
and involved process that may have involved the use of fictions. The
result is that the rule may be stated in an awkward fashion likely to
affect adversely its future development and its application to particular fact situations. The Restatement can cut through this verbiage
and determine the essence of the rule. One of the original concepts
of the Institute was to find and express the principles underlying the
rules. Enlightened courts will recognize the value of the new statement, and the future of the rule is thus assured.
The classic example of this is section 339 of the first Restatement of
Torts, covering the liability of a landowner to trespassing children for
injuries from a dangerous condition on the landowner's premises.
Bound by the traditional rule that a landowner owes no duty of care
to a trespasser, the courts invented the "attractive nuisance doctrine." The children were not trespassers but were instead invitees,
courts said, because they were attracted to the dangerous condition,
29
lured onto the premises "like dogs to a piece of stinking meat."
This altered the categoric rule, but the fiction created undue restrictions and sometimes imposed a duty that was too broad. Section 339
in the second Restatement eliminated this fiction and laid down in a
logical fashion the conditions necessary for recovery. Courts quickly
recognized the validity of the change in language, and the section has
been widely adopted, with only one or two courts getting into difficulty by holding onto the original approach.
Section 402A of the first Restatement of Torts, involving strict tort
liability for products, may also come within this category. Courts had
long been holding liability for personal injuries and property damage
on the basis of implied warranty. This was actually strict liability,
29. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 400 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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there being no need to show fault. The only problem was the requirement of privity of contract, and courts had been assiduously
working on various fictional devices to circumvent the privity requirement. Once section 402A, in conjunction with the Traynor opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products., Inc.,30 made it clear that
the action really sounds in tort (liability being imposed by the law for
physical injury rather than for loss of bargain), the courts seized the
31
explanation and strict product liability swept the country.
B. Finding the ProperMean Between Too Much Rigidity and Too
Much Flexibility.
Human beings have an innate desire for the kind of certainty that
will make a decision automatic and not require the exercise of a discriminating judgment. Primitive law was very rigid, treating everybody the same way. But differences of facts and circumstances might
make it unfair to treat two cases the same way. One way of handling
this is to draft a very detailed list of exceptions or qualifications to
the rule. This raises two problems: the sub-rule may itself be too
rigid; and discretion may be needed to determine which sub-rule to
apply. The common law came up with another device-the use of
standards. A "standard" is an expression that requires the exercise
of discretion in its application, such as standards for due process or
negligence (what a reasonable prudent person would do or not do
under similar circumstances). Dean Pound declared that the use of
standards is a development of modern law. 32 They supplement rules
and permit the production of a decision tailor-made for each individual case, in the light of its particular circumstances.
Restaters need to determine in each instance whether to "restate"
a broad general principle, a more specific rule with or without more
specific exceptions and qualifications, or a rule containing standards.
In the first Restatement, the Blackletter stood almost by itself, at
least in the beginning. In the second Restatement, the Blackletter
loses some of its dominance and serves more as an introduction to the
Comments.
Sometimes a Restatement uses a very indefinite phrase. This
started with section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts, which
30. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
31. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
32. Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 44 REP. A.B.A.
445, 456-59 (1919).

provided that a promise reasonably inducing definite and substantial
action "is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.
S. ."33 Phrases of this type are normally used only in determining
what relief should be available, rather than in laying down a rule for
conduct. But compare the definition of conversion in the second Restatement of Torts: "(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with
the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." 34 This definition is supplemented by a subsection 2, which gives a list of six
factors for determining when there is conversion. The Advisory
Committee spent an afternoon trying to work out a more precise
rule, but the factors varied so much in significance under particular
circumstances and in combination with each other that greater precision could not be attained.
On a few other occasions the drafters found they could do no better than to state a list of factors. This usually occurs when the law is
3
still in an inchoate shape, not yet having attained crystallization. 5
Remember, however, that Comments supplementing the Blackletter
serve to describe and indicate the relative significance of the several
factors.
C. No Decisions or Other Established Law on the Topic.
If the topic has not been important enough to become the subject
of litigation, it may perhaps be ignored. It may, however, be sufficiently important and likely enough to arise that something should
be said about it. The statement would then be likely to be in the
Comments rather than the Blackletter, and it would probably be reasoned out by deduction from the logical implications rather than
from the rules that are expressed.
If the problem is quite important and there is no logically impelling basis for reaching a decision, it may be handled by use of a caveat, which would say that the Institute takes no position on the
issue. This would usually be accompanied by a Comment describing
the possibilities for resolving it.
D.

Two Separate Lines of Authority.
When the lines of authority are not in agreement, it normally be-

33. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
35. See, e.g., id. § 520 (factors to determine strict liability for abnormally dangerous conduct); id § 767 (factors for determining whether an interference with contractual relations is "improper"); i, § 895D (factors for determining whether public officer
is immune).
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comes necessary to choose between them. The decision is not only
influenced by the number of states espousing each, but also by the
convincing quality of the several court opinions and the viewpoint of
the Restaters as to which is the better rule - the more principled
one. Sometimes, however, it is possible to produce a compromise between the two positions - to take the more desirable elements of
each position and merge them into a single rule. This felicitous result can aid not only in reforming the law but also in promoting
36
uniformity.
E. Effect to Be Given to Statutes as the Basis for a Change in the
Law.
Should statutes modifying the common law be counted in determining whether to adopt the position that they take? It could be argued that since the Restatement is stating the common law, statutes
should not be counted. But a statutory change expresses the policy of
the state as effectively as a judicial change, and the practice has been
to consider both of them in drafting a section. I can think of three
such examples in the second Restatement of Torts - contribution between joint tortfeasors, 37 the single publication rule in defamation,38
and abrogation or modification of tort immunity for municipalities
39
and states.
F.

A Decision in a Single Case Alters the Law in All of the States.

It has not been the practice of the Institute to undertake a restatement of subjects involving federal constitutional law. But defamation
is a matter of tort law, and the first Restatement of Torts covered defamation without any questions and without problems in this respect.
When work on the second Restatement reached the chapter on defa36. A striking example occurred regarding the dispute between Dean Prosser, the
Torts Reporter, and Professor Eldredge, a member of the Advisory Committee, on the
need to prove special damages in a libel action where the defamatory character of the
communication is not apparent on its face. They had fought in the law reviews and
were fighting on the floor of the Institute on this issue. A suggestion from the floor
that proof of damages be required when the defendant neither knew nor should have
known that the communication was defamatory was adopted as a suitable compromise.
This solution was adopted in Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970). But
before it was incorporated into the published volume, it was rendered unnecessary by
the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), requiring fault in all cases. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
38. Id. § 577A.
39. Id. §§ 895B, 895C.

OF TORTS

§ 886A (1979).

mation, the decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 40 and several of its progeny cases had already been rendered. The Institute
decided that they must be taken into consideration because a chapter
on defamation would be not only useless, but actively misleading, if it
failed to indicate the effect of the newly-announced constitutional
principles. The drafting work was undertaken and discussed vigorously at all levels of the editorial process. The refined copy was ultimately adopted by the Institute, subject to some reworking by the
Reporter, particularly regarding the meaning of the opinions in the
41
plurality holding in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
42
Later that year came the holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
disapproving Rosenbloom and setting up entirely new standards for
defamation actions by a private plaintiff. Obviously, it was back to
the drawing board for a completely fresh start. Interpretation
problems were rife, and there were numerous implications for other
parts of defamation law that very probably did not occur to any of
the justices when Gertz was decided.
Here are some of the problems considered and the decisions
reached:
(1) Is Gertz likely to be stable in view of (1) its 5-4 holding, with
one of the five concurring justices dubious about the holding but joining in anyway to attain a "definitive ruling," and (2) the fluidity of
the line-up of the justices in previous cases? Should its effect instead
be regarded as so uncertain that as little change as possible should be
made in the Restatement, pending clarification by the courts? Decision: regard it as stable because the four dissenting justices had split
in opposite directions, and decide what to do about each of its implications. This decision has been vindicated by later developments.
(2) Do the new requirements of proving fault regarding truth or
falsity and proof of actual injury apply to non-media defendants?
The Gertz opinion gave no indication. Decision: discuss in the Comments; urge that they not be confined to media defendants. 43 Lower
court decisions have been divided on this issue, but it now seems
clear that this will be the result.44
40.
41.
42.
43.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment e (1977).
44. The most recent consideration of the problem by the Supreme Court does not
provide an official answer, but seems to settle the matter. In Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983), affd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985),
the Vermont Supreme Court held that the media protections outlined in Gertz are inapplicable in non-media defamation actions and allowed damages for "presumed damages" and punitive damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, "[r]ecognizing
disagreement among the lower courts about when the protections of Gertz apply." 105
S. Ct. at 2942. It affirmed "for reasons different from those relied upon by the Vermont Supreme Court." Id. The lower court's distinction between media and non-media
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(3) Does the requirement of proving fault apply not only to issue
of truth or falsity, but also to such issues as whether there was fault
regarding the content of the communication, the defamatory nature
of the communication, its reference to the plaintiff, and its publication to third persons? Decision: discuss in the Comments without
45
taking any formal position.
(4) Do the Gertz constitutional limitations regarding actual damages and liability without fault apply to all defamatory publications
not covered by the New York Times standard, or will the application
be limited to publications of the type involved in Gertz? Decision:
discuss in the Comments, indicating the possibility that application of
the Gertz requirements might be restricted to matters of public or
general interest or be held to exclude other matters such as private
gossip or commercial speech, but do not alter the language of the
Blackletter to provide for this possibility.46 The validity of this decision has now been impaired by the very recent holding in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,47 which, like Gertz, has
defendants was not specifically ruled on by the Court, but it was repudiated in two
opinions. See id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring with the plurality opinion); id. at 2959
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan counted six justices who disapproved the
distinction.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comments b-f (1977).
46. See id. § 580B comment f (fault), § 621 comment b (damages).
47. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). Greenmoss held that the constitutional requirement of
"actual damages" does not apply to a defamatory publication that does not involve a
"matter of public concern," so that a state may award both presumed damages and punitive damages without any showing of "actual malice" (knowledge or reckless disregard regarding the truth or falsity of the communication).
This holding is quite surprising because Gertz itself had repudiated the previous
holding in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), in which the plurality
opinion had extended the knowledge-and-reckless-disregard rule beyond suits by public officials and public figures to any suit involving a matter that is a "subject of public
or general interest." In Gertz, the Court discussed the balance to be drawn in the two
situations but made the principal basis for its decision and based its holding primarily
on the difficulties in defining the term, "subject of public or general interest." Note
the language:
"Theoretically, of course, the balance ... might be struck on a case-by-case basis....
But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it would render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable.
Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application." 418 U.S. at 34344. "The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality
would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable. And
it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide
on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not ....
We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of
judges ....
Id. at 346.
And yet in Greenmoss, the Court is creating a third, new class of actions applying

raised more serious problems of interpretation. For example, will
the Greenmoss rule apply to the Gertz prohibition against strict liability and permit states to impose liability for a reasonable mistake?
Will a state have authority to award punitive damages for mere negligence or even in the absence of negligence?
(5) Should the Gertz developments on fault have the effect of
shifting the burden of proof as to truth or falsity from the defendant
to the plaintiff? There are good arguments both ways. Decision: use
a caveat. 48 One or two courts have held that the burden is shifted to
the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court has not formally committed
itself.49

(6) What is the effect of the Gertz fault requirement on the whole
system of qualified privileges for defamation? The first Restatement
followed the rule of a substantial majority of the courts that publishing the statement without reasonable basis for believing it to be true
was equivalent to an abuse of the privilege and meant that it was lost.
But Gertz requires a showing of negligence in order to have a cause
of action at all. Thus meeting the Gertz requirement would mean
that the privilege was automatically lost. What to do? Decision:
adopt a minority rule stating that the qualified privilege is lost only if
the defendant acted with knowledge of the statement's falsity or
reckless disregard of its truth.50 Several cases have subsequently
adopted this solution, but the Supreme Court has not passed on it
and it may decide to leave the matter to the states. 51
(7) What significance should be attached to Justice Powell's statement in the majority opinion that "there is no such thing as a false
idea" or opinion?52 Decision: combine it with the holdings in two
"when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern." 105 S. Ct. at
2944.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 caveat, comment j (1977).
49. For the proposition that the burden is now on the plaintiff, see Wilson v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.), cert. granted 454 U.S. 962
(1981). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the case was settled before the
Court could decide it.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment 1, § 599 comment d,
§ 600 (1977). See also id, chapter 25, topic 3, special note on conditional privileges at

259.
51. See, e.g., British Am. & E. Co. v. Wirth, Ltd., 592 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1979); Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Moore v. Smith, 89 Wash. 2d 932,
578 P.2d 26 (1978).
If the Greenmoss rule eliminating the constitutional requirement of proof of actual
damages in an action by a private plaintiff involving the publication of a matter not of
public concern is held to apply to the constitutional requirement of fault, it will apparently require three different rules as to the effect of a qualified privilege - one for
suits by public officials or public persons, one for suits involving a matter of public
concern, and a third for suits by a private person not involving a matter of public concern. See supra notes 44 and 47.
52. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the

[Vol. 13: 59, 1985]

The Restatement (Second): A Tribute
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

other Supreme Court cases and on this basis change section 566 to
provide that there can be no recovery for a mere expression of opinion as long as it does not imply the existence of unstated defamatory
facts that justify the opinion. 53 There have been a number of subsequent cases on this subject, most of which are in accord with the general conclusion that a mere opinion is not actionable.54 But there is
considerable disagreement on how to define a nonactionable opinion.
(8) What is the effect of the fault requirement on the compromise
solution previously adopted regarding the rules on libel per se and libel per quod? Decision: the general Gertz requirement of fault covers the specific requirement imposed by the compromise in the case
of libel per se and so allows libel per se to be the rule without partic55
ular reference to fault.
(9) Will the fault requirements of Gertz and New York Times apply to torts other than defamation, such as invasion of privacy and
injurious falsehood? Decision: use caveats, with explanations, in the
chapters on these torts.56 The Supreme Court has since held that the
standards apply to both an invasion of privacy 57 and an injurious
falsehood,58 but in somewhat different fashions.
The Gertz case is by no means typical, but it does indicate the kinds
of problems that can arise for the first time and the ad hoc solutions
necessary to respond to them when there is no authority in point.
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
53. The other two cases are Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974), and Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). Section 566
now reads: "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of
an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation
of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
54. See also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976);
Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d
943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). The leading case is Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (laying down a test based on four factors), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2662 (1985). This problem will eventually require a definitive decision by the
Supreme Court.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977).
56. See id. § 652E caveat, comment d (false light privacy); id. § 623A caveat, comments c-g (injurious falsehood).
57. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
58. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).

VII.

CONCLUSION: THE RESTATEMENTS AND THE FUTURE

The Restatements were the product of a novel and original concept
of a few public-spirited leaders of the legal profession, who created in
1923 the American Law Institute and set it to work analyzing, organizing, and expressing ("re-stating") the underlying principles in
certain important fields of the law. This product was not intended to
be like an encyclopedia of the law or most of the legal treatises of
that time, which merely collected and compiled the holdings of the
courts, indicating differences of position, without much more. Nor
was it to be like the European civil codes derived from the Roman
law, which were legislative in origin and the authoritative starting
point of any judicial determination.59
Instead, the Restatements relied for their influence upon their inherent validity and worth in expressing the underlying principles as
Blackletter "rules" of law. The endeavor was successful. Few students of the law would deny that the state of the common law was in
a much better condition as a result of the first Restatement. The law
became better organized, better expressed, and more nearly uniform.
The first Restatement weathered the arrows of criticism from various points of view - traditionalists, 60 American legal realists with
their disdain for "rules,"61 and civilians urging that the Restatements
be enacted as a code. 62 Use of the Restatement by lawyers, judges,
and law schools constantly grew, and one measure of its success was
the enthusiasm with which the Institute's decision to undertake a
second Restatement was received.
The second Restatement has been, in my opinion, a distinct improvement over the first Restatement. The process of evaluation,
with the Institute profiting from the experiences incurred in working
on the first series and exploiting the ideas that appear to have
worked best, has caused the second series to become less imperious in
59. See Report of the 1923 Committee, supra note 27, at 27-30.
60. Professor Keyes' article may be classified as espousing the traditionalist view.
One of the greatest controversies involving the traditionalist view was over section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Helms, The Restatement: Existing Law
or Prophecy, 56 A.B.A. J. 152 (1970); Memorandum of the Defense Research Institute's
American Law Institute Committee Regarding the Restatement of the Law, 9 FOR THE
DEFENSE, May 1968, no. 5. Director Wechsler's response to the memorandum is in
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147 (1969).
61. See, e.g., Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800
(1931); Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); Milner, Restatement, The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1959).
Cf. Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do?, 34 MICH. L. REV. 461
(1936).
62. See Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement as Transitionalto Codification,47 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1934). Cf. Fleming, supra
note 11, at 108-16; Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 140 (1981).
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its pronouncements and more judicious and adaptable. I think it has
also proved to be more beneficial to the users, and I believe that the
great majority of persons who have had occasion to deal with both series would agree with this assessment.
The charge that the second Restatement is misleading, because it is
ready to adopt a minority position and lay it down as a rule purporting to state the law as it exists, cannot be sustained as an intentional
attempt to misstate the law. The first Restatement occasionally
adopted a minority position, sometimes without indicating this fact.
The second Restatement has followed a practice of stating expressly
in the Comments or in the Reporter's Notes when this has been
done. There may have been occasions when, through inadvertence,
this did not occur, and more care in this regard should be exercised
in the future.
Nor is there any basis for asserting that the use of the name "Restatement" carries an implied representation that is not true. The
dictionary defines "restate" as meaning "to state again or in another
way," 63 and a leading law dictionary defines "Restatement of Law"

by stating that its purpose is to "tell what the law in a general area is,
how it is changing, and what direction the authors think this change
should take ... ."64

But it does appear that somewhat different approaches on the subject of law reform may have developed in some Restatements. In
their enthusiasm for straightening out some egregious "errors" in the
law, where there existed a much better minority position to adopt,
some Restaters may have glided into the position of creating their
own solutions to problems arising from undesirable rules and placing
those solutions in the Blackletter, with or without a full explanation
in the Reporter's Notes.6 5 A clearer and somewhat more consistent
practice would be helpful.
One of the strongest reasons for the success of the Restatement has
been the way in which the Institute has been able to enlist and harness the enthusiasm, energy, abilities, and best efforts of leading
scholars, practitioners, and judges. If all of the hours spent by all of
the persons connected with the Institute for a particular Restatement
63.

WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1936 (1966).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979).

65. Professor Keyes lists some such instances in his article. Many of these instances can be fully explained, some on the basis that the writers he quoted were unhappy that their individual solutions were not adopted. It would prolong this article
too much to try to refer to each of them.

were cumulated and charged at the rate those persons could command for legal work of the same nature, the figure would be astronomical. Yet the only person receiving compensation is the Reporter,
who takes on the work as a second career and whose pay was declared by one Reporter to be at a rate much lower than that for any
other legal work he ever did. The meetings of the Committee of Advisors are eagerly anticipated by all participants and are exhilarating
while they last.66 There is the good feeling of being engaged in probono work for the benefit of the legal system as a whole, and of the
country, too. This has the added effect of producing an impartial objective attitude, even in lawyers whose attitude is normally that of an
advocate.
The Restatement has been a very valuable invention whose usefulness has been clearly demonstrated.6 7 The time will soon come when
the Institute will need to decide whether to begin work on a third Restatement. It will probably appoint a special committee to study the
matter and present recommendations for the action of the Council.
Because of appellate courts' currently developing practice of accepting the responsibility for adapting and changing the common law
to keep it in accord with present needs and ideals, the answer seems
clear that some updating of the second Restatement will be needed,
whether it is in the form of a supplement or a new third Restatement.
In the second Restatement of Torts, for example, the chapters on contributory negligence and assumption of risk must be completely reworked.68 All but six of the states have substituted comparative
negligence for contributory negligence. 69 The subjects of professional
negligence and strict products liability are now covered by only a single section each. 70 More elaborate treatment is needed to cover their
recent development. Still other outdated provisions need updating
and revising, especially in the first two volumes. The other Restatements present similar problems.
The committee should consider what is the most desirable way to
keep the Restatements functioning effectively in the future. Indeed,
the committee might well be appointed as a standing committee on
Restatements. It would then be in a position to consider criticisms
66. I have tried to express my feelings about the work on the Advisory Committee
in Wade, William L Prosser: Some Impressions and Recollections, 60 CALIF. L. REV.

1255, 1257-60 (1972).
67. Cf. the careful evaluation in Fleming, supra note 11, at 108-16.

68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS chapters 17 (contributory negligence),
17A (assumption of risk) (1965).
69. The six states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 299A (professional negligence), 402A
(strict tort liability for products) (1965).
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and suggestions as they arise.7 1 It could reassess the format of the
Restatements and determine what improvements could be implemented in the light of experience. It could also bring the differences
in style of the individual Restatements more into uniformity. It
should confront the problem of how recommendations for law reform can be made without necessarily stating the recommendation as
Blackletter law, and find a reasonable solution that can be consistently followed. Greater uniformity in the form, location, and content
of the Reporter's Notes is desirable. Some persons have urged that
the Restatements should be updated annually; the committee can consider whether this is a good idea.
The committee can also consider what lessons should be derived
from the current project on Corporate Governance. 72 Its format initially states the law as it should be, and then explains in the Notes to
what extent and in what form that ideal statement is in accord with
the present state of the law. The committee should decide whether
this format is an appropriate one for the Restatements to adopt in
general.
The committee would probably find it desirable to prepare an appropriate vade mecum, in the form of a manual suitable for ready
reference, to aid in obtaining greater uniformity in the individual Restatements. This product might advert to such diverse matters as the
relative significance of certain listed factors used in determining
what rule to adopt and the scope of its coverage, the order of arrangement and titles for Comment paragraphs, the handling of crossreferences, and the location and form of Reporter's Notes. A stylebook, like that used by law reviews, might provide guidance regarding capitalization, type of print (e.g., blackletter or italics), citation
forms, abbreviations, and similar matters.
A standing committee might decide that it is desirable to establish
a legal periodical called, perhaps, the Restatement Law Review or the
ALI Law Journal. This journal could publish, reprint, or digest items
discussing Restatement matters - full-length articles, suggestions for
improvement, criticisms, responses, reports of committees, treat71. Complaints have recently been made about the open-ended character of some
Restatement sections. Those sections specifically referred to are RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (strict tort liability for products); and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (choice-of-law principles used in determining what state has the "most significant relationship" with the transaction).
72. See generally THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982). The project is nearing completion.

ments of particularly important cases and their relation to Restatement provisions, and annual lists of important cases, perhaps
accompanied by analytical comments on their significance. Such a
law journal could be a very stimulating and useful periodical.73
The following are some other matters that a standing committee
might consider:
(1) Closer cooperation once again with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Recommendations for law
reform may involve statutory recommendations, and the two bodies
have cooperated splendidly on such items as the Uniform Commercial Code.
(2) Establishment of a Research Staff. This was proposed in the
original 1923 Report that led to the establishment of the American
Law Institute and the Restatements. 74 Many useful projects for a
staff of this nature can be envisioned if it can be financed.
(3) Determination whether there are new subjects suitable for Restatement treatment.
(4) Consideration whether it would be desirable for the Institute to
undertake projects similar to the Restatements but covering topics
75
much more limited in scope.
For the sake of unity, I have confined my discussion here largely to
the American Law Institute's work on the Restatements. The Institute has engaged in many other activities that have been beneficial in
various ways to the status of American law and the legal profession.
The Institute has clearly proved its worth, and its prospects for the
future are bright if its current leaders are as forward-looking, publicspirited, and ingenious as were its founders. I believe that they are,

and that the Institute will continue to serve ably and effectively in
aiding the legal profession, the judicial system and the country as a

whole by improving the state of the law and its administration.

73. The Symposium on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1981) provides a fine example of what the periodical might carry. The Keyes and
Wade articles published herein would perhaps also be suitable.
74. Report of the 1923 Committee, supra note 27, at 54-56.
75. Since writing this, I have learned that a Special Committee on Institute Program has been appointed and that it is well advanced in considering the feasibility and
usefulness of a number of projects of this nature.

